recaps of the top 'ask me anything' interviews from reddit and more...
A flood of coronavirus apps are tracking all of us. We're the MIT Technology Review team helping you keep track of them. Ask us anything!

Technologists everywhere have been rushing to build apps, services, and systems for contact tracing: identifying and notifying all those who come in contact with a covid-19 carrier. Some are lightweight and temporary, while others are pervasive and invasive: China's system, for example, sucks up data including citizens' identity, location, and even online payment history so that local police can watch for those who break quarantine rules.

Opinions differ on whether these apps are just a technocratic daydream or—if done correctly—a potentially useful supplement to manual tracing. But the reality is that these services are already rolling out, and many more are likely to come in the next few months.

Despite the avalanche of services, however, we know very little about them or how they could affect society. How many people will download and use them, and how widely used do they have to be in order to succeed? What data will they collect, and who is it shared with? How will that information be used in the future? Are there policies in place to prevent abuse?

At MIT Technology Review, we started asking these questions and found that there were not always clear answers.

So to help monitor this fast-evolving situation, we've gathered the information into a single place for the first time with our Covid Tracing Tracker—a database to capture details of every significant automated contact tracing effort around the world.

We've been working with a range of experts to understand what we need to look at, pulling sources including government documents, announcements, and media reports, as well as talking directly to those who are making these apps to understand the technologies and policies involved.

Ask us anything about your country's automated contact tracing app, contact tracing more broadly, data privacy, or how you can participate in this project.

We're Bobbie Johnson, an editor and lead on the project, Tate Ryan-Mosley, Tech Review's research manager, and Patrick Howell O'Neill, its cybersecurity and privacy reporter. Ask us anything!


May 19th 2020
interview date

The mobile carriers collect location data (via tower triangulation, etc.). How precise & accurate is this data? Could it be used for contact tracing if needed?


Good question. We previously looked at technical issues surrounding the use of Bluetooth and we're looking at location data now. The short answer is that the precision and accuracy of location data varies drastically.

Triangulation depends on many variables (for instance, is your phone even connected to three towers? In rural areas, the answer could be as low as 0 towers.) but it boils down to the best case scenario being 3/4 of a mile precision which is not precise enough on an individual level but which can provide aggregate data that could in theory help understand an outbreak. To point out the other method being used for location tracking, GPS is generally far more precise in good conditions but also depends on many variables including the weather, your hardware, whether you're inside or outside, and availability of satellites.

All of that adds up to some problems that are impossible to pin down exactly but which are definitely significant. To answer your question (in what I'm sure is a pretty unsatisfying way, I'm sorry about that), yes it can be (and is being) used for contact tracing if needed but there will be significant problems including false positives and negatives that has to be accounted for.

There's another side/cost to location tracking which is the privacy dimension. That varies from project to project and it wasn't the point of your question so I won't delve into it but I felt it had to be at least pointed out. - Patrick


Can you please give us a breakdown on various contact tracing technologies (Bluetooth, GPS, ultrasound) - and there respective pros and cons? I'd like to know about privacy, accuracy, battery impact, etc.

Thank you!


Ooh, that’s a big question! I think part of it is very difficult to answer both accurately and comprehensively. Not only are there very different implementations of each technology across lots of different apps (we’re currently tracking 26 distinct national efforts around the world and I’m sure there are more) and the impact on, say, your phone can still be very different to somebody else’s based on things like operating system, what other services you’re using, etc etc. Plus lots of them are not deployed yet!

We haven’t had many user reports on what the practical usage is like (though feel free to email them to us at [](, I’d love to see them)

So here’s what I can say with confidence.

Bluetooth is the most commonly deployed technology across all these apps, but the effectiveness and the impact on your phone varies wildly from app to app. There are a few emerging standards here, and they try to tap into Bluetooth Low Energy (LE). The notable ones are DP-3T, PEPP-PT out of Europe, and BlueTrace out of Singapore. We’re also going to see Apple and Google’s exposure notification API out in the wild very soon, which is Bluetooth LE based and may become dominant very quickly.

Even though it’s the most common system being used, Bluetooth is a really tricky technology for avoiding false positives and negatives, as Patrick reported in some detail here:

Other technologies are much less widely used.

GPS is used by a few of these apps, but its accuracy is typically around 15 feet.

For cellphone triangulation, see our answer in another question:

And I’ve seen reports of some people building apps using ultrasonics, but I don’t believe we’ve seen anybody deploy an ultrasonic service at national/governmental scale. —Bobbie


Hi. I live in India and we have here "Arogya Setu" app. I want to know if it is safe ?

Thanks for the AMA


Hi -- We're not tracking the safety of apps with this project. We're tracking how the apps work (in Aarogya Setu's case, it uses Bluetooth and location data) and how the data is used, what kind of data it collects, if the data is ever destroyed, if the app is voluntary, and if the project is transparent. Some of those questions can also help you figure out if the app is safe for you.

In India's case, the app is not voluntary, data use is not effectively minimized or limited, and it's not been a particularly transparent effort. It does have over 100 million users and offers a wide range of services that no other app does.

It's a complicated decision, we're trying to provide more data to help inform people but we are not making recommendations. - Patrick


Why are you not tracking adoption targets (e.g. 60% use in the UK) and reported adoption rates? (Not a criticism, but wanted to know if you'd had that discussion)


Hi! Tate Ryan-Mosley here, one of the authors. It's a really great question because, yes, adoption rate is a direct link to efficacy. That said, efficacy of these apps is still really unclear. In short, we are tracking them. There isn't a lot of data on user downloads yet, so we decided to not include it in the skeleton database that you see embedded in our article, but you can find it in this public database -


dumb question, so, if Location, GPS, bluetooth is turned off, these tracker apps fail? have you found evidence of apps circumventing user's ability to disable services?


It's not a dumb question. You're right: if you essentially flip your phone into airplane mode, these tracing apps don't work. We haven't seen any evidence of any app preventing a user from doing this, but here's a really important point: unless you live in one of a very small number of countries, nobody is forcing you to download a contact tracing app.

So if you're worried, just don't download it.
We've reported on mandatory usage, for example, with India's confusing 'voluntary mandatory' policy, but most countries don't do this:

I want to be really clear here, though: contact tracing, whether it's done manually—by a healthcare worker calling you on the phone to warn you that you've been exposed and work out who else might have been infected—or automated, as in these apps, is a vitally important part of keeping an infectious disease from spreading. We're monitoring the privacy and transparency elements around each of these apps, because there are legitimate concerns about data use and surveillance—but that doesn't mean that contact tracing itself is problematic.

The most important thing you can do is follow guidelines and, if a contact tracer calls you to talk about your health, please pick up the phone, confirm they are who they say, and talk with them. —Bobbie


Qatar recently made it mandatory for their app the be installed on your device before you leave the house for any reason, can you add it to the list? I would be interested to see how you rate it. The app is called EHTERAZ.


Thanks for pointing this out, we're adding it today. We appreciate your help! - Patrick


Did you know that Thailand introduced mandatory tracking app few days ago? It has a bar code which has to be scanned at entrance and exit from every shopping mall, department store etc. Basically, you have to register at government owned website, with personal data, to be issued with personalised bar code, otherwise you are denied entrance to any public space, including restaurants.


That's a new one to us. We're adding it now, thank you—definitely looks like it's worth further investigation; if you have any useful sources of information on this, please email them to []( —Bobbie


Could you tell me what I can do to opt out of this? Basically, what can I do to physically prevent you from tracking me?

Personally, I am much more worried about the misuse of this technology.


Yes, misuse is for sure a concern. The most essential consideration for you is whether the app in your country is indeed voluntary which basically means you can decide to just not download the app at all. Some of the apps also have the ability to turn off data streams once the app is on your phone such as data coming from GPS or Bluetooth. Let me also breakdown what the privacy attributes we use are because it took us a while to really grasp our own definitions and speaks to how complicated privacy is. We define them in our original article and they are based off of ACLU guidelines, but I'll explain.

We have: 1) Voluntary which I already described (Note: if there are large groups of people for which its mandatory like those infected or those employed at certain companies, we did not award a star. See India); 2) Limited means that the data collected gets used only by health authorities for tracing covid-19 spread (this speaks to your question about misuse); 3) Data Destruction indicates whether there is an explicit policy for destroying the data collected within 30 days; 4) Minimized means that the data collected is really essential for tracing covid-19 spread. (IE: its important that your phone number, name, preexisting conditions, etc aren't collected) and 5) The government is transparent about the app meaning the code is open sourced and its really easy for a user to understand exactly what data collect, how its collected, who has access to it, and how its used. - Tate


Depending on the user agreements (which no one reads), once installed, will we have agreed to be tracked forever once this thing is over? Can we ever go back?


This depends on your locale as well as the apps and authorities in question. For exactly this reason, our tracker looks at data destruction, i.e. Does the app auto-delete or offer you the opportunity to delete your data? Is there a sunset clause? - Patrick


All of the technologies mentioned in your article rely on either Bluetooth or GPS. Could you please comment on the efficacy of such Bluetooth and GPS solutions, considering the signals emitted from both technologies register interactions from upwards of 30 feet (10 meters) away? Is there a danger to this much false positive reporting? In a city like Manhattan, solutions using Bluetooth or GPS would penetrate walls and floors, and very easily over-report interactions. Have you explored ultrasonic contact-tracing solutions instead?


Hi Sagb. You're right, these underlying technologies are far from perfect.
We actually did a story recently on the problems with using Bluetooth, which is by far and away the most common technology used in these apps.
A lot of people are working hard to try and come up with ways to prevent false positives and negatives, but it's certainly not easy. But there are ways to determine exposure than simple proximity—so these new protocols don't just register whether you've been "near" somebody else (without understasnding if there was, say, a wall between you) they look at signal strength, time, and even things like phone orientation or screen activation to get more clues about possible exposure.

As for ultrasonics: I've seen some examples of this in theory—there was an app out of Carnegie Mellon, for example, but ultrasonics have their own set of privacy concerns, potential for false positives, and have a much smaller base of engineering expertise. I haven't seen anybody use those in the wild yet, although it may happen —Bobbie


Right now we are only documenting apps backed by national governments, but we might expand that in the near future. Please send other contact tracing apps for us to investigate at []( - Tate


So you track the trackers, but who tracks the tracker trackers?


be the tracker tracker tracker you wish to see in the world - Patrick


I am a frontline healthcare worker. I think that the world could have done a better job tracking infection earlier in the pandemic, before this was a pandemic, but there were/are massive privacy and civil liberty issues that go along with this.

Historically tracing happened, most famously, with John Snow. There were no privacy or civil liberty issues then but he collected less invasive information and it was a different social period.

In your team’s opinion, what is a good balance for these apps between protecting the health of larger communities and individual choice?

People that really want to circumvent tracking apps can delete them/restore phone or not take their phone with them. Would less invasive data collection be received better when some people refuse to get routine vaccinations and don’t trust the ‘system’/‘man’?


You're right, kevin—if anybody really wants to circumvent tracking apps, they can do that by not taking their phone with them. But remember—they aren't being forced to use the tracking apps in the first place, so it's easier to just opt out and not download them.
That's why we track whether these systems are voluntary or not (in nearly every democracy they are voluntary.)

It's really important to note your point that the work of manual contact tracers, even if they're a bit more technologically-assisted than John Snow was with cholera, is ABSOLUTELY VITAL to keeping this disease under control.

I think people who are worried about tracking apps forget that most of the real work in tracing contacts isn't about hi-tech surveillance, it's done by humans who are working hard to keep you and the people you love safe. The apps are really there to help cover larger numbers of people, to help both you and them understand whether you might have been exposed, at which point the human process takes over.

In India, a family who avoided testing and weren't helpful to contact tracers ended up exposing hundreds of people, putting them and their families in danger, and making vast amounts of work for the local team trying to keep the disease under control, as we reported here.

That said, the reality is that while most people have the choice on whether to download an app or not, they don't have choice about which app to download. Your country, or your state, probably has a single service that it wants everyone to use. So that's why we think it's important that using an app remains an individual choice, based on people's individual circumstances. Think about your needs, your loved ones, your community, and take into account whether you're comfortable with what you're being asked to do. Unless it's mandatory—and the chances are it's not—you still have choices. —Bobbie


How would we go about tracking your tracing tracker to make sure you’re not tracking us?


I was going to give you a joke, but I'll take this question at face value given the upvotes: our tracker is a spreadsheet that collates information about automated contact tracing apps. It's tracking them, not tracking you. Maybe look at it in incognito mode and print it out if you're that worried? —Bobbie


Does the United States not have an official app from the CDC or some other government institution?


Ya this is a super good question. In short - no, and we speculate that its pretty unlikely that there will be at national-level in the US. Contact tracing in the US will probably fall to state governments, or even more local government bodies like cities and municipalities. Many states have started manual contact tracing initiatives already, and we think that there might be a proliferation of state contact tracing apps that supplement the manual efforts, especially when the Google/Apple API goes live. We are tracking apps built by state governments already with the intention to publish that data in the near future. Right now, we are aware apps in Utah, North Dakota and South Dakota.

If the Google/Apple API becomes the default backbone for many (maybe all) of the state-owned apps (we don't yet know if this will happen), I just want to point out what this means for how we responding to the crisis. Though Google/Apple aren't a government-body and are in no way beheld to the best interest of the public, they really are setting the operational framework and privacy/ data-sharing norms for digital contact tracing. - Tate


If I were to work in a location where my company is using tracing apps, but I want to ensure my privacy for the long term, would a solution be to use an old cell phone (with no sim card) to use as a tracking beacon while at work (and leaving it at work when I leave) as opposed to installing some encrypted software on my daily driver phone?


I can't speak directly to the rules in place in your country or the ones your employer might put in place, but this would certainly be a possibility. The old phone would work as a bluetooth beacon. However, it's also entirely possible that this may not be something that they would accept: if you were diagnosed with covid, tracing would want to examine your contacts outside the workplace as well as inside. So I suppose I'm saying read the fine print. —Bobbie


What’s your go-to VPN?


Hi, thanks for doing this AMA. In your article you reward stars for different categories, which is a fantastic idea. Will you also provide sources for the individual reasons and maybe an unknown indicator in case it’s not confirmed yet wether an app is positive or negative in that category?


Thanks for the question! You're right in that we only award a positive star if we can say 'yes' to a question ("does this app delete data after 30 days or less?" for example.) We don't differentiate in the star rating between a 'no' and a 'we don't know.'

But we actually do provide that information—as well as extra sources and explanatory notes—in a couple of ways. If you take a look at the underlying spreadsheet that this is drawn from, you'll see 'TBD' in a number of cells; this is where the information is currently unknown. There are also some links in there to source materials.

You can also see a bit more detail on those sources and decisions as they come in by looking at our changelog. We update that most weekdays, whenever we have updates. Sometimes it's a lot, sometimes it's a little.

Hope that helps —Bobbie


What was your analysis on Italian app 'IMMUNI"? One of the major investors in the company is Berlusconi's son.


Great question. You can see how we scored Immuni in our database. Bobbie, Patrick, or Tate might have more insight to share.



Over in the UK, the NHS are making the COVID tracking app and I believe they have decided to open source it. Do you think that this is a good thing, and does it make your job any easier?


Making something open source is generally a positive in our view of what's happening here; it's more transparent, it allows people to interrogate the code, look for bugs, and check that the government and health authorities are doing what they say they're doing.

It also allows other people to reuse and build on that code for their own contact tracing efforts, which potentially allows folks to get where they're going faster and potentially improve on the work of others (this is what's happening with Singapore's TraceTogether app, one of the early operators, because they open-sourced its BlueTrace protocol and so now it's been picked up by Australia and others.)

But it's not a surefire signal for complete transparency or privacy-protecting behavior—things can still be hidden inside the code, and it doesn't stop bad or confusing policies from existing around important elements of how the app behaves. For example: it might be easier to spot and solve bugs, but if you flag them up are they actually dealt with by the developers? Being open source doesn't make the developers more responsive. Is this data shared with other organizations or agencies outside of healthcare? It's hard to know this just by looking at the code.

Either way it doesn't really make our job any easier at this point, although it does potentially increase the number of eyes on a particular codebase. The more people who look and tell us what they find, the better! —Bobbie


How are they going to track me when I don't even own a cell phone?


Contact tracing apps are new, contact tracing itself is an old and proven technique that has long depended on human beings doing the work. Depending on where you are and what your government is doing, they may call you on the phone or speak with you in person. - Patrick


Hi, I live in QATAR and the app name is Ehteraz. It is now mandatory and the phone permissions seem a lot. Can you advise on its abilities and if it is based on any other countries apps?


Thanks for the question u/Pearlfish. This is Benji. We have added Qatar's app as one we plan to follow up on. Once we rate it, we'll add it to our database, which you can follow here:

  1. Wouldn’t it be better if all tracing apps makes use of Apple’s and Google’s API?
  2. Do you think there are any potential vulnerabilities or privacy issues regarding the Google’s and Apple’s API?
  3. Do you prefer iOS or Android? Why?


These are awesome questions and I will offer my opinion on #1, though I'm not sure how satisfying it will be. I think there are a lot of benefits if many apps leveraged Apple/Google API, importantly interoperability across different places, development efficiency and scale. It really would be great if apps worked across different states and countries, and there were many developers who could learn from each other and collaborate so we could build the best app quickly. Also its hard to ignore that adoption could be so much faster if Google and Apple were the leading players. The API also does seem to seek being privacy-preserving, so it might enable some improvements across the board. All of this assumes that contact tracing apps will be meaningful in slowing the spread and allowing public spaces to reopen.

That said, I also think its a bit scary to let Apple/Google have so much power in controlling the infrastructure and data policies if it does indeed become the default framework and scales as it could. Its just important to remember that they aren't beheld to the public's best interest, and I think its really important that they work closely with the WHO or the UN so that they can contribute the technical prowess while still answering to a higher power that does have an obligation to the global citizenry. - Tate


When Google bought Fitbit, people were concerned with mass tracking. Is that happening so far?


Google hasn't actually completed the acquisition of Fitbit yet, so the question is moot. But I would suggest that the proposition of Google doing mass tracking is well within their reach, given their web services, phones, laptops, smart home products, and so on. Just doing some rough back-of-the-envelope calculations here: Fitbit sold approximately 16 million devices in 2019; Android is the operating system for approximately 70-80% of all smartphones, and there were something like 1.5 billion smartphones sold in 2019. That means it's orders of magnitude more concerning, if you are concerned.—Bobbie


Isn't the John Hopkins/NY Times tracker the gold standard?


Good question! This is Benji. The New York Times map shows reported covid-19 cases worldwide. Contact tracing is a bit different. Here's a definition of this technique Patrick included in this story about the things we need to do to make contact tracing really work:

> Tracing is the technique public health workers use to identify carriers of an infectious disease and then uncover who else they may have exposed, in an effort to isolate those at risk and halt the illness’s spread. It’s a time-tested investigation method used to successfully fight outbreaks of diseases including measles, HIV, and Ebola. Countries around the world are already using it against covid-19 with great success, and now many US states are beginning to assemble their own covid tracing teams. At the same time, powerful technology companies including Apple and Google are building systems to help expand and automate tracing and notify people who might have been exposed.

And here's how automated contact tracing apps come into play:

> [T]echnologists everywhere have been rushing to build apps, services, and systems for contact tracing: identifying and notifying all those who come in contact with a carrier. Some are lightweight and temporary, while others are pervasive and invasive: China’s system, for example, sucks up data including citizens’ identity, location, and even online payment history so that local police can watch for those who break quarantine rules.

Some services are being produced locally by small groups of coders, while others are vast, global operations. Apple and Google are mobilizing huge teams to build their upcoming systems that notify people of potential exposure, which could be used by hundreds of millions of people almost immediately.

Our database is meant to track these apps, including details on what they are, how they work, and what policies and processes have been put in place around them.


Would it be possible to develop custom hardware for contact tracing rather than using people's private phones? Eg, sport bands have BTLE and cost almost nothing these days.


Thanks for the question! I've seen two noteworthy projects around this that have government-backing. The first is in Bahrain, and they also have an app (that we added to the database just last night). You can read about the bracelet here. The bracelet appears to do contact tracing. The other project I've seen is Corona-Datenspende out of Germany. We've exchanged a few emails with them, and they want to make it clear that it isn't contact tracing but rather symptom monitoring. To me personally, using bracelets for symptom monitoring makes more sense than for contact tracing. I think in terms of scale and the capability of the hardware, mobile will make mass contact tracing easier. - Tate


As a paranoid stoner - are us stoners tracked too? All I do is go to work, go to weed store, go to grocery store, and go home but I’m curious as to if others care enough about what I do


Definitely tempted to offer a joke answer here but let me get serious for just a minute. This question is the reason we tracked data limitations ('Limited' in the chart): Data may sometimes be used for purposes other than public health, such as law enforcement—and that may last longer than covid-19.

I don't know where you live, what app there is, etc., so the answer varies. Some places have strong privacy laws governing this, others hand the data straight to the police. Some locales delete the data after 30 days or whenever the user wants, some keep it indefinitely. These are all important attributes that we want to help folks be informed about.

My advice would be to find out if there is a contact tracing effort near you, if an app even exists for your area, and if it does investigate what the privacy rules and attributes of the app are. We are tracking a few dozen such apps now and are expanding our view to include American apps shortly. - Patrick


Can genomic data from.ancestory or 23 and me be used to correlate with a person who is asymptomatic and then used to deduce if a person is predispositionsed to contracting severe symptoms or not?

South korea had drive through testing that text results to your phone within 45 minutes is that possible here?

If im signed into my vpn but i accept conditions for loccations while signed into my gmail am i being tracked? Facebook? All my apps? Do vpns block the location tracking?


Interesting questions! I'll let Bobbie, Patrick, or Tate answer your last two. As for your question about genomic data, we're still learning if there are genetic clues that tip off why some people get so sick from covid-19. We just published a story about it last week!

- Benji


what are your thoughts on the long-term impacts of tracing? I'm fully in support of using contact tracing and understand that it's necessary in this time but I'm also concerned about how this tech (and further innovations of it) could be used in less savory ways in the infringement of people's privacy. What measures are you taking to ensure that the technology that you're devising to trace covid remains solely a method for tracking disease?


Thanks for the question. I think the two attributes you are most interested in that we use in our database are limited and data destruction. Limited means no one other than health authorities have access to the data and data destruction means that the data is sunset after 30 days.


I recently read about your project. I appreciate your dedication to this, as it is becoming clear that we need test and trace to achieve any level of normalcy. My question is: It appears that the majority of the tracing proposals/programs depend on our cell phones, which may lead to long term privacy issues. I read about workers on construction sites using bluetooth "dongles" to trace and I wondered if it would be possible to do something similar on a larger, more global scale? This would allow us to throw the dongles away when no longer required and no longer be tracked in any way.


Some countries are using separate devices to do exactly this—Bahrain, for example, is handing out monitoring wristbands. These could be useful at a global level, but also face a lot of practical hurdles: manufacturing millions or even billions of takes both money and time. One reason for using mobile phones is that they are already so pervasive that governments can roll out an app that covers a large proportion of the population very quickly, and they don't have to bear the cost of deploying the hardware. Imagine every supply chain issue we've seen with getting PPE to frontline healthcare workers, but across an entire population. That's tough! I think it can work for a limited population, but difficult to achieve at anything approaching global scale. —Bobbie


Any info on Australia's effort COVIDSAFE - most people I know don't want to download it because we don't know if the info is secure?


It's included in our database. We gave it a star for every criteria except for transparency. We found Australia's effort wasn't transparent, meaning it didn't take the form of clear, publicly available policies and design, an open-source code base, or all of these.



I haven't seen any info on UAE's TraceCovid, it seems like it's voluntary. How would you rate it?


Also, how effective is it if I run it on an old phone to avoid installing it on my main one?

Thanks for all the efforts


Thanks u/jakfast! We're adding the UAE's app to our list now! I'll let Patrick, Bobbie, or Tate answer your second question. - Benji


What's your opinion on Aarogya Setu, the Indian Government's app used to monitor Covid cases?


We actually published a story about it somewhat recently!



Whats your opinion on the italian "immuni" app?


Here's how we scored Immuni in our database. Bobbie, Patrick, or Tate might have more insight to share.



You don't have the Colombia's INS (national health institute) "CoronaApp" app listed yet. Here's the link to play store:


Thank you! We have added it to apps we're following up on.


Where are these apps in the US? Like actual working ones, not just some code thrown up on github for demo purposes.


This is Benji. Tate answered a question earlier about whether the US would have a federally organized contact tracing app. Here's what she had to say:

Ya this is a super good question. In short - no, and we speculate that its pretty unlikely that there will be at national-level in the US. Contact tracing in the US will probably fall to state governments, or even more local government bodies like cities and municipalities. Many states have started manual contact tracing initiatives already, and we think that there might be a proliferation of state contact tracing apps that supplement the manual efforts, especially when the Google/Apple API goes live. We are tracking apps built by state governments already with the intention to publish that data in the near future. Right now, we are aware apps in Utah, North Dakota and South Dakota.

If the Google/Apple API becomes the default backbone for many (maybe all) of the state-owned apps (we don't yet know if this will happen), I just want to point out what this means for how we responding to the crisis. Though Google/Apple aren't a government-body and are in no way beheld to the best interest of the public, they really are setting the operational framework and privacy/ data-sharing norms for digital contact tracing. - Tate


Hello and thank you for doing this!

Here in Germany the development and decision making on the app by the government has been kind of a mess, but recently they decided to not go for the PEPP-PT version, but make a decentralized version with Apple and Google and make it open-source. This seems definitely like the right decision to me. Now a few institutions say that they had to do it, cause public support is the most important thing, since it's voluntary, but they prefer the PEPP-PT version. Can you give more insight on this and maybe point out some main advantages and drawbacks of both options?

Also kind of in the same tone, do you see big differences in the willingness to use the App in the general society of different countries? For example in Germany I get the feeling that the mindset is very warily towards stuff like this, so I'm doubtful even with perfect transparency it will be hard to reach a useful number of users, how big of a problem is this in some countries?

Thank you again.


I wanted to thank you for this question - so thoughtful and so important. We are doing more reporting on this question as we speak, and its a bit hard for me to say for certain why some government's might prefer a centralized approach. Watch out for more from us on this topic in the future.

To answer your second question - yes there are definitely cultural differences when it comes to privacy. One tension that is important is the dynamic between individual freedoms/ protections and collective safety. I think we see this play out many ways with covid-19 - from comparing the Chinese response to the US response, resistance to wearing masks, and attitudes around contact tracing and data privacy. They are all different issues so I don't want to convolute them, but in some ways they are all iterations on a theme. I also think its really important to highlight and watch the voluntariness of the apps - adoption for some countries is not going to be a choice so we can't really say whether the culture of those countries feels a certain way about the apps - they might not have a choice. - Tate


Hi, I am wondering why you consider the German CoronaApp non transparent, seeing as it is becoming open source when launched and the government is actively seeking support by the open source community. Could you elaborate on why you consider it non-transparent?


Good question - we've found that Germany's contact tracing app is really in flux, and we haven't been able to confirm a name and maker. We do know the initiative is underway, but can you tell me what you are referring to? I know they flipped from a centralized app to a decentralized approach recently. - Tate


Hi. Fantastic resource. Any info on the New Zealand ap. That has now been put forward by government over Rippl which is another ap. A lot of retailers here are now using? Thank you.


Thanks! We will check it out! - Tate


Thanks! We will check it out! - Tate


Who is the largest contact tracer in the US, and what are you doing to ensure that apps in the ecosystem can share exposure information with one another?


The largest contact tracer right now is a whole bunch of people calling other citizens, sponsored and organized by state governments. Our colleague wrote a great article breaking it down here. In terms of digital contact tracing, only three states have announced apps so far - North Dakota, South Dakota and Utah. We surmise that there will be a proliferation of state-based apps one the Google/Apple API goes live. The API is supposed to be interoperable so that other apps using the API will be able to share information, but that is tbd at this point - Tate


If I would like to be a part of contact tracing which app would you recommend to install? (I'm android but Mrs is apple)


What country do you live in? - Benji


Is there any concern about improper use of the tracking? That never happens, right?


There absolutely is! That's why we launched this project! - Benji


Can you match me a wine based off my preference of chocolate?


Tawakkalna from KSA?


Thanks! We're adding it to our list of apps we plan to follow up on! -Benji

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